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Abstract
When encoding a scene into memory, people store both the
overall gist of the scene and detailed information about a few
specific objects. Moreover, they use the gist to guide their
choice of which specific objects to remember. However, for-
mal models of change detection, like those used to estimate
visual working memory capacity, generally assume people rep-
resent no higher-order structure about the display and choose
which items to encode at random. We present a probabilis-
tic model of change detection that attempts to bridge this gap
by formalizing the encoding of both specific items and higher-
order information about simple working memory displays. We
show that this model successfully predicts change detection
performance for individual displays of patterned dots. More
generally, we show that it is necessary for the model to en-
code higher-order structure in order to accurately predict hu-
man performance in the change detection task. This work thus
confirms and formalizes the role of higher-order structure in
visual working memory.
Keywords: change detection; visual short-term memory;
working memory; probabilistic model
Introduction
Working memory capacity constrains cognitive abilities in a
wide variety of domains (Baddeley, 2000), including general
intelligence and reading comprehension (Daneman & Car-
penter, 1980). The architecture and limits of the working
memory system have therefore been extensively studied, and
many models have been developed to help explain the lim-
its on our capacity to hold information actively in mind (e.g.,
Cowan, 2001; Miyake & Shah, 1999). In the domain of vi-
sual working memory, these models have grown particularly
sophisticated (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Bays, Catalao, &
Husain, 2009; Cowan, 2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Wilken
& Ma, 2004; Zhang & Luck, 2008). However, nearly all of
these models focus on memory for extremely simple displays
of presegmented objects. Furthermore, these models address
only average performance across displays and do not make
predictions about the difficulty of particular displays.
By contrast to these simple displays, memory for real-
world stimuli depends greatly on the background knowledge
and principles of perceptual organization our visual system
brings to bear on a particular stimulus. For example, when
trying to remember real-world scenes, people encode both
the gist and detailed information about some specific ob-
jects (Hollingworth, 2004). Moreover, they use the gist to
guide their choice of which specific objects to remember
(Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000), and when later trying
to recall the details of the scene, they are influenced by this
gist, tending to remember objects that are consistent with the
scene but were not in fact present (Lampinen, Copeland, &
Neuschatz, 2001). Existing models of the architecture of
working memory do not address any of these hierarchical en-
coding or perceptual grouping factors. For this reason, they
are unsatisfying as explanations of what observers will re-
member about more complex displays in which objects are
not randomly chosen, but instead make up a coherent scene.
In this paper we reformulate change detection as rational
probabilistic inference in a generative model (similar in spirit
to Huber, Shiffrin, Lyle, and Ruys (2001) and Hemmer and
Steyvers (2009b)). Rather than modeling the memory pro-
cess per se, we model how observers encode a scene, and
treat change detection as a probabilistic inference that at-
tempts to invert this encoding model. We show that earlier
models of visual working memory capacity are special cases
of this framework, and show how our model can be extended
to include the encoding of gist or higher-order structure. We
thus take the first steps toward formalizing working memory
capacity for displays in which the items are not all treated
independently.
Visual working memory
One of the most popular ways to examine visual working
memory capacity has been with a change detection task (Luck
& Vogel, 1997). In this task, observers are presented with
a small number of different colored squares (2, 4, 8, or 16)
and told to remember which color appeared in which loca-
tion. The squares then disappear for a brief period, and when
they reappear they either are all the same colors as before, or
contain one square which has changed color. Observers must
report whether the display is the same or whether one of the
squares changed color.
It is generally found that observers accurately detect
changes when there are fewer than 3-4 simple colored
squares, and as the number of squares increases above 4 ob-
servers accuracy steadily decreases (Luck & Vogel, 1997).
In order to quantify this decrease and derive a capacity mea-
sure for the contents of visual working memory, change de-
tection tasks have been modeled and formalized (Rouder et
al., 2008; Wilken & Ma, 2004). For example, in the stan-
dard “slot” model of visual working memory (Cowan, 2001;
Luck & Vogel, 1997; Rouder et al., 2008), it is assumed that
on a display with N items observers perfectly recall the color
of K items and completely forget the other N-K items on the
display. Using this model, it is possible to convert change de-
tection performance into an estimate of K, and these capac-
ity estimates, termed Cowan’s K, are widely reported in the
literature on visual working memory (Alvarez & Cavanagh,
2004; Brady, Konkle, & Alvarez, 2009; Cowan, 2001; Luck
& Vogel, 1997).
Figure 1: Methods of the change detection task modeled and
used in Experiments 1 and 2. Observers are first briefly pre-
sented with a display, and then after a 1 sec blank are pre-
sented with another display where either the items are ex-
actly the same or one item has changed color. They must say
whether the two displays are the same or different.
Aside from Cowan’s K, there are other models used to
quantify working memory capacity (Bays et al., 2009; Wilken
& Ma, 2004; Zhang & Luck, 2008). However, the displays
used always consist of simple stimuli like colored dots that
are sampled uniformly, limiting any overarching structure or
gist. All existing models of change detection thus ignore the
presence of higher-order structure and prior knowledge that
characterize change detection in real-world scenes (Simons
& Rensink, 2005).
A probabilistic model of change detection
We present a probabilistic model of change detection that
attempts to bridge the gap between the simple models used
to formalize working memory capacity and the complicated
phenomena that characterize memory for real-world scenes.
Thus, we sought to model change detection in cases where the
displays to be remembered were not just random colored dots
but also exhibited some higher-order structure. As stimuli we
created 5x5 patterns in which each space was filled in by a
red or blue circle (or black and white square, see Figure 3).
The items could form patterns that were anything from com-
pletely random to completely one color or vertical or hori-
zontal lines. Our displays were thus simple relative to real
scenes but were complex enough that we expected existing
models, which encode dots at random, would fail to predict
what people remember about these displays.
Our modeling preceded in two stages, mirroring the two
stages of a standard change detection task: view and encode
display one, then view display two and decide if a change
occurred (See Figure 1).
While the observer is encoding the first display, they have
access to the color of all the dots present in the first dis-
play. We propose that observers use this information to do
two things: first, they infer what ”gist” may have given rise
to this display; then, using this gist, they select the subset of
the dots least well captured by the gist and encode these items
specifically into an item memory. The specific dots to encode
are selected based on how unlikely they are under the gist.
Those that are the biggest outliers (e.g., least well captured
by the gist) are encoded into an item memory that specifically
encodes their colors.
After a short viewing, the first display disappears and the
observer is left with only what they encoded about it in mem-
ory. Then, some time later, a second display appears and the
observer must decide, based on what they have encoded in
memory, whether this display is exactly the same as the first
display. Thus, at the time of the second display (detection),
the observer has access to the new display and the informa-
tion in memory. Using the constraint that at most one item
will have changed, it is then possible to use Bayesian infer-
ence to put a probability on each possible first display, and,
using these probabilities, to calculate the likelihood of that
the display changed.
Importantly, when the model encodes no higher-order
structure it recovers the standard slot-based model of change
detection. However, when the displays do have higher-order
regularities or ’gist’, our model uses this information to both
select appropriate individual items to remember and to infer
properties of the display that are not specifically encoded.
Encoding
The graphical model representation of the encoding model
(shown in Figure 2) specifies how the stimuli are initially en-
coded into memory. We observe the first image (D1), and we
use this to both infer the higher-order structure that may have
generated this image (G) and to choose the specific set of K
items to remember from this image (S).
In the model, any given “gist” must specify which displays
are probable and which are improbable under that gist. Unfor-
tunately, even in simple displays like ours with only 2 color
choices and 25 dots, there are 225 possible displays. This
makes creating a set of gists by hand and specifying the like-
lihood each one gives to each of the 225 displays infeasible.
Thus, as a simplifiying asumption we chose to define gists
using Markov Random Fields, which allow us to specify a
probability distribution over all images by simply defining a
small number of parameters about how nodes tend to differ
from their immediate neighbors; such models have been used
extensively in computer vision (Geman & Geman, 1984). We
use only two gist parameters, which specify how often dots
are the same or different color than their horizontal neigh-
bors (Gh) and how often dots are the same or different color
than their vertical neighbors (Gv). Thus, one particular gist
(Gh = 1,Gv = −1) might specify that horizontal neighbors
tend to be alike but vertical neighbors tend to differ (e.g., the
display looks like it has horizontal stripes in it). This gist
would give high likelihood to displays that have many similar
horizontal neighbors and few similar vertical neighbors.
We treat each dot in these change detection displays as a
random variable D1i , where the set of possible values of each
Figure 2: The model expressed in graphical model notation
for (A) encoding and (B) detection. Filled circles indicate a
node is observed (the model has access to it). Unfilled cir-
cles indicate the model must infer the value of the node. The
arrows are colored based on what kind of process they repre-
sent. D1=the first display, D2=the second display, G=the gist
S=specific items, C=the presence of a change.
D1i is -1 (color 1) or 1 (color 2). To define the distribution
over possible displays given the gist parameters, P(D|G), we
assume that the color of each dot is independent of the color
of all other dots when conditioned on its immediate horizontal
and vertical neighbors.
We thus have two different kind of neighborhood relations
(clique potentials) in our model. One two parameters (Gh and
Gv) apply only to cliques of horizontal and vertical neighbors
in the lattice (Nh and Nv) respectively. Thus, P(D1|G) is de-
fined as:
P(D1|G) = exp
(−En(D1|G))
Z(G)
(1)
En(D1|G) = Gv ∑
(i, j)∈Nv
ψ(D1i ,D
1
j)+Gh ∑
(i, j)∈Nh
ψ(D1i ,D
1
j)
where the partition function:
Z(G) =∑
D1
exp
(
−E(D1|G)
)
normalizes the distribution. ψ(D1i ,D1j) is 1 if D1i = D1j and
-1 otherwise. If G > 0 the distribution will favor displays
where neighbors tend to be similar colors, and if G < 0 the
distribution will favor displays where neighbors tend to be
different colors.
The ”gist” of the display is therefore represented by the
parameters G of an MRF defined over the display. Our def-
inition of p(D1|G)) thus defines the probability distribution
p(display|gist). To complete the encoding model we also
need to define p(items|display,gist) (p(S|D1,G)). To do so,
we define a probability distribution that preferentially en-
codes outlier objects (objects that do not fit well with the gist).
We choose whether to remember each object from the dis-
play by looking independently at the conditional probability
of that object under the gist, assuming all of its neighbors are
fixed p(D1i |G,D1/i). S denotes the set of K specific objects
encoded: S= s1, ...,sk. To choose S, we rank all possible sets
of objects of size 0, 1, 2, ... to K objects based on how un-
likely they are under the encoded gist. Thus, the probability
of encoding a set of objects (S) is:
p(S|G,D1) = ∏
j:s j∈S
[1− p(D1j |G,D1/ j)] ∏
j:s j /∈S
p(D1j |G,D1/ j) (2)
This defines p(S|D1,G), which provides the probability of
encoding a particular set of specific items in a given display,
p(items|display,gist), in our model.
To compute the model predictions we use exact infer-
ence. However, due to the computational difficulty of in-
ferring the entire posterior distribution on MRF parame-
ters for a given display (e.g., the difficulty of comput-
ing Z(G)), and because we do not wish to reduce our
gist to a single point estimate, we do not compute ei-
ther the maximum posterior MRF parameters for a given
display or the full posterior on G. Instead, we store
the posterior in a grid of values for G in both horizontal
and vertical directions (Gh =−1.5,−1,−.5,0, .5,1,1.5,Gv =
−1.5,−1,−.5,0, .5,1,1.5). We compute the likelihood of the
display under each of these combinations of Gh and Gv and
then choose the items to store (S) by integrating over the dif-
ferent choices of G (we store the full posterior over S)). We
choose a uniform prior on the gist (e.g., a uniform prior on
MRF parameters G).
In summary, to encode a display we first treat the display as
an MRF. We then calculate the posterior on possible gists by
calculating a posterior on G at various (pre-specified) values
of G. We then use this G and the original display to compute
a posterior on which set of ≤ K items to encode into item
memory (S). At the completion of encoding we have both a
distribution on gists (G) and a distribution on items to remem-
ber (S), and these are the values we maintain in memory for
the detection stage.
Detection
At the detection stage, we need to infer the probability of a
change to the display. To do so, we attempt to recover the
first display using only the information we have in memory
and the information available in the second display. Thus, us-
ing the probabilistic model, we work backwards through the
encoding process, so that, for example, all the possible first
displays that don’t match the specific items we remembered
are ruled out because we would not have encoded a dot as red
if it were in fact blue.
More generally, to do this inference we must specify
P(D1|S), P(D1|D2), P(D1|X), P(S|G,D1). Almost all of
these probabilities are calculated by simply inverting the
model we use for encoding the display into memory initially
with a uniform prior on possible first displays. Thus, P(D1|G)
is given by Equation 1, and P(S|G,D1) is given by Equation
2.
Those probabilities not specified in the forward model rep-
resent aspects of the change detection task. Thus, P(D1|S) is
a uniform distribution over first displays that are consistent
with the items in memory and 0 for displays where one of
those items differs. This represents our simplifying assump-
tion (common to standard “slot” models of visual working
memory) that items in memory are stored without noise and
are never forgotten (it is possible to add noise to these mem-
ory representations by making P(D1|S) a multinomial distri-
bution over possible values of each item, but for simplicity
we do not model such noise here). P(D1|D2) is uniform dis-
tribution over all displays D1 such that either D1 = D2 or at
most one dot differs between D1 and D2. This represents the
simple fact that the task instructions indicate at most one dot
will change color.
Together these distributions specify the probability of a
particular first display given the information we have about
the second display and information we have in memory,
P(D1|G,S,D2). Given the one-to-one correspondence be-
tween first displays and possible changes, we can convert this
distribution over first displays to a distribution over possible
changes. Our prior on whether or not there is a change is
0.5, such that 50% of the mass is assigned to the “no change”
display and the other 50% is split among all possible single
changes. Thus:
P(C|G,S,D2)= 0.5P(D
1 = D2|G,S,D2)
0.5P(D1 = D2|G,S,D2)+0.5∑P(D1 6= D2|G,S,D2)
This fully specifies the model of change detection.
Experiment 1 and 2
To examine human memory performance, we collected data
using Amazon Mechanical Turk, where we had observers per-
form a change detection task for each of 24 different displays.
We then compared this performance to our model.
The model makes predictions about how hard it is to de-
tect changes in particular displays of colored dots (i.e., some
changes will be more difficult to detect than others). In addi-
tion, it makes predictions about overall accuracy for a particu-
lar set of displays. We can thus examine how well the model
fits with human memory performance in two distinct ways:
(1) How many particular items (K) the model needs to recall
to match human performance overall, and (2) how well the
model’s predictions about the difficulty of particular displays
correlate with human memory performance.
Method
We sampled a set of 16 displays from the Markov Random
Field model we use to define our gist (using Gibbs Sampling).
Four of these displays were sampled from each of Gh = ±1,
Gv = ±1. In addition, we generated 8 displays randomly.
In Experiment 1, these 24 displays consisted of red and blue
dots. In Experiment 2 they were exactly the same displays,
but composed of black and white squares instead.
The displays were presented to 65 participants in Exp. 1
and a separate set of 65 participants in Exp. 2 using Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk. The first display was flashed up for
750 ms (timing was controlled using Javascript), followed by
Figure 3: The fit of our probabilistic model to the observers’
data with K=4 in the model for Experiments 1 and 2. Each
point is the d’ for a pair of displays. Approximate error bars
are shown for both the subjects and model, calculated by
bootstrapping standard errors. Example of both a hard and
easy pairs of displays is shown for each experiment.
a 750ms blank period; then the second display was flashed
up for 750ms in a different screen location. Observers’ task
was simply to say whether the two flashed displays were the
same or different (See Figure 1). Each display was presented
to each observer in both a ”same” and ”different” trial, so ob-
servers completed 48 trials each, with the entire experiment
lasting approximately 4 minutes. The order of the 48 trials
was randomly shuffled for each subject. Observers were paid
30 cents for their time.
Results
For each display we computed a d’, measuring how difficult
it was to detect the change in that display (averaged across
observers). Performance in Experiments 1 and 2 was highly
similar, as the correlation in the display-by-display d’ was
r=0.91 between the two experiments. Thus performance was
collapsed across both experiments for the remaining analyses.
On average, human observers d’ was 2.18 (S.E. 0.06) sug-
gesting they were quite good at detecting changes on these
displays. Since the displays contain 25 dots, this d’ corre-
sponds to a Cowan’s K of nearly 16.1 dots if the items are
assumed to be represented independently and with no sum-
mary information encoded (Cowan, 2001). This is nearly 5
times the number usually found in simpler displays and thus
represents a challenge to standard models of change detection
and visual working memory capacity.
Importantly, our claim is not that observers remember 16
individual dots. Instead, our model provides an alternative
explanation. The model achieves the same performance as
people (d’=2.18) with a K value of only 4, thus encoding
only four specific dots in addition to the display’s gist (model
d’=1.2, 1.8, 2.05, 2.25 at K=1, 2, 3, 4). This is because the
model does not represent each dot independently: instead, it
represents both higher-order information as well as informa-
tion about specific dots. The model thus aligns nicely with
both previous work from visual working memory suggesting
a capacity of 3-4 simple items (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Cowan,
2001) and also with data from the literature on real-world
scenes which suggests a hierarchical representation with both
gist and item information (e.g. Lampinen et al., 2001).
In addition to describing overall memory capacity, we can
also examine the difficulty of particular displays. Previous
models of change detection treat all displays as interchange-
able, since they choose which objects to encode at random
and do not represent any summary information about the dis-
play. They thus make no predictions about which particular
changes will be hard or easy to detect. However, observers re-
liably find it more difficult to detect change in some displays
than others, as measured both by averaging 200 split-half cor-
relations on d-prime (r=0.75) and by bootstrapping standard
errors on observers’ d-prime (see Figure 3).
Our model does not treat each item independently, and
chooses which items to encode by making strategic decisions
based on the display’s gist. Thus, our model does make pre-
dictions about the difficulty of detecting particular changes.
In fact, the correlation between the model’s difficulty with in-
dividual displays and the human performance on these dis-
plays was quite high (overall: r=0.71, p<0.0001; Exp.1:
r=0.65, Exp.2: r=0.73; See Figure 3). Thus, the model’s
simple gist representation captures which changes people are
likely to detect and which they are likely to miss.
Discussion
We here present a formal model of change detection which
relies upon probabilistic inference to make predictions about
visual working memory. The model takes into account the
hierarchical nature of memory typically found in real-world
scenes. It successfully predicts the display-by-display dif-
ficulty of visual working memory displays, indicating which
changes observers will find easy to detect and which they will
find difficult. The model also converges with the standard vi-
sual working memory literature on an estimate of 3-4 indi-
vidual objects remembered, even in more complex patterned
displays.
Importantly, the model recovers previous models of visual
working memory capacity as a special case, and thus captures
the properties of those models in displays with no higher-
order information. However, by formulating change detec-
tion in terms of probabilistic inference, we can make much
richer models of working memory than those typically used
to calculate capacity in visual working memory experiments.
Non-independence in Visual Working Memory
While almost all experiments on visual working memory treat
the items to be remembered as indepedent units, there are sev-
eral exceptions (e.g., Jiang, Olson, & Chun, 2000; Sanocki
& Sulman, 2008; Jiang, Chun, & Olson, 2004; Vidal, Gau-
chou, Tallon-Baudry, & Oregan, 2005). The most prominant
exception to this assumption of independence is the work of
Jiang et al. (2000), who suggested that the spatial context of
other items is important to simple change detection tasks. On
displays where the item that changed is presented in the con-
text of the other items present at encoding, observers perform
better at change detection (Jiang et al., 2000). This suggests
the items are not represented independently of their spatial
context. This is compatible with the encoding of both sum-
mary information and specific items used in our probabilistic
model.
In addition, previous work by Brady et al. (2009); Brady
and Alvarez (2010) demonstrates that observers can be in-
duced to encode displays with colored dots using statistical
regularities present between the dots, rather than treating each
dot separately. Observers not only use information about co-
occurence between items to form more compressed represen-
tations of these displays (Brady et al., 2009) but also encode
the displays at multiple levels of abstraction, combining both
an overall summary of the display and information about par-
ticular dots (Brady & Alvarez, 2010).
More broadly, the idea that memory encoding and retrieval
are based on information represented at multiple levels of ab-
straction is common in the literature on reconstructive mem-
ory (Bartlett, 1932). Recent computational models similar in
spirit to the one presented here have formalized this in both
the domains of object size memory (Hemmer & Steyvers,
2009b) and more recently in the combination of gist and
specific objects in real-world scenes (Hemmer & Steyvers,
2009a).
Chunking, Perceptual Grouping and Gist
One of the most popular explanations for observers’ better-
than-expected performance with more complex stimuli is
chunking, or forming larger units out of smaller subsets of
the stimuli (Miller, 1956; Cowan, 2001). In this framework,
performance on our displays of patterned dots could be a re-
sult of observers’ remembering only 3-4 independent items
from the display and not encoding any overarching gist or
structure. Instead, the items they remember would simply
consist of multiple dots grouped into single items. This ex-
planation has been proposed, for example, to explain why
observers are better than expected at empty-cell localization
tasks using patterned stimuli much like ours (Hollingworth,
Hyun, & Zhang, 2005) and why some displays are remem-
bered more easily than others in same/different tasks (Howe
& Jung, 1986).
This kind of chunking could potentially explain observers’
performance on our displays. However, our preliminary work
with a model that partitions the display into contiguous re-
gions of the same color and remembers K of these regions
suggests that such a model does not adequately explain per-
formance in the current experiments. Instead, such a model
either fails to capture the pattern of human errors or requires
memory for an overly large number of regions (K>5) to
achieve human levels of performance. However, future work
is needed to examine models that perform such grouping or
chunking and compare them with models, like ours, that rep-
resent the displays at multiple levels of abstraction.
Model of Gist
In the model the ”gist” is encoded using Markov Random
Fields, and thus the only information that can be represented
are local spatial continuity properties of the colors in the dis-
play (similiarity between horizontal and vertical neighbors).
Obviously, this is too impoverished to be a fully accurate
model of human visual memory, even for such simple dot
displays. For example, we could draw letters or shapes in the
dot patterns, and people would recall those patterns well by
summarizing them with a gist-like representation. Our model
cannot capture such representations. However, we believe
that our model nonetheless represents a step forward in un-
derstanding how people make use of such gist during change
detection.
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